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This paper summarizes recent literature on the experience of some existing currency
boards. It begins with the definition of the currency board and the description of some
existing currency boards. It then discusses advantages and disadvantages of implementing
the currency board regime, and concludes with a list of conditions that must be satisfied
if a country wants to adopt this monetary framework. 
5
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 203  Design and Operation of Existing Currency ...I. Definition
From the wide range of currency regimes, the choice of currency board has become
very popular in the 1990s. Under this framework, the use of monetary policy is very
restricted, and under the strict currency board, a government cannot operate any
monetary policy at all. The currency board is  after the monetary union  the second
most rigid form of exchange rate regimes.
Exchange rate regimes can be classified into floating, fixed, and all the varieties of
pegged and target bands, and managed float that lie between the two extremes.
Currency board in its orthodox form is a fixed exchange rate regime. The role of
monetary authorities is reduced to issuing notes and coins that are fully backed by a
foreign reserve currency or  less frequently  to a basket of currencies. The central bank
is obliged to exchange domestic currency for a reserve currency on demand at a fixed
exchange rate. There is a minimum of 100% foreign reserve requirement, and currency
boards often hold excess reserves to guard against asset valuation changes. These excess
reserves are related to the net worth of the currency board [Pautola and Backé, 1998],
because seignorage can be earned only from interest on reserves. What is important,
currency boards are established by law in order to protect them from political and
various interest group pressures. 
The currency board regimes have been usually implemented in order to gain
credibility and thus reduce inflation. Under this framework, monetary authorities are
unable to grant credits to the government or to troubled financial institutions. The
monetary policy is determined solely by market forces and the currency board cannot
intervene on the market. However, the monetary authority has some flexibility under less
rigid types of currency board regime.
2. How are Currency Boards Related to Other Monetary and 
Exchange Rate Regimes?
As it was already mentioned, the currency board is a very rigid form of fixed exchange
rate commitment. Somewhat less  rigid exchange rate regime is the fixed exchange rate
of the West African and  Central  African currency unions that fixed their currencies
either to the French franc or to  the  dollar. Next comes the adjustable peg, where the
exchange rate is declared fixed,  but  in  fact  undergoes realignments  from  time to  time.
6
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 203  Ma³gorzata JakubiakWhen the crawling peg is regularly reset, monetary authorities can either try to reduce
inflation or they have the tools to keep the real exchange rate steady. A more flexible type
of exchange rate peg is the basket peg, and extra flexibility comes from the fact that the
weights of the basket currencies are often kept in secret. Target zone or target band
allows for interventions when the exchange rate hits a band of either side of parity. When
the target band is sufficiently wide, it approaches a float. Managed float allows for
interventions at a foreign exchange market. These are usually buying the currency when
it is rising and selling when it is falling in order not to allow that all the variation in the
demand for this currency is shown in the exchange rate. Finally, the free float means that
there are no interventions on the foreign exchange market, but private supply and
demand for currency clear the market [Frankel, 1999].
As can be seen from the above brief characteristics of the different types of the
exchange rate regimes, the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy is closely
related to the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate. While domestic monetary policy
does not exist under the monetary union or under the currency board and the interest
rates are solely market-determined, there is a scope for an independent monetary policy
under the pure float, but the exchange-rate policy has to be abandoned. Thus under both
the free float and the fixed exchange rate regimes, conflicts between monetary and
exchange rate policies do not arise. Conversely to this, it is argued [Culp et al., 1999] that
classical balance of payments crises are inevitable when monetary authorities try to control
both the exchange rate and the monetary policy, as in the pegged rates and pure floats.
Frankel (1999) suggests that the reason behind this is that in a world of high capital
mobility, it is impossible to attain both exchange rate stability and monetary
independence, and that higher capital mobility means narrowing the choice of among the
extent of capital controls, monetary independence and exchange rate stability into the
simple choice of the exchange rate regime. And since the only choices that cannot be
subject to speculative attacks are the two extremes, the currency board system is often
an optimal solution for some small, open economies.
Although in principle an orthodox currency board has no central bank and no room
for discretionary monetary policy, there exist "currency-board-like" regimes, when some
discretionary monetary policy is allowed. In such modified systems central bank has some
flexibility to provide financial support to banks from its reserves or by borrowing money
on the foreign exchange market. The monetary authorities may sometimes issue
securities. In the case of Argentina, for example, local currency is not fully backed by the
foreign currency reserves, which gives another instrument for discretionary monetary
policy [Hanke and Schuler, 1999] [1].
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[1] Only 66.6 of the monetary base has to be kept in foreign assets and gold.3. Experience from Existing Currency Boards
The idea of the currency board arrangements has been invented for the British
colonies in the XIXth century. There, they provided both fiscal revenues and monetary
stability [Ghosh et al., 1998]. After these countries gained independence, the currency
boards generally fell into disuse. Now, in recent years, the idea of the currency board has
become again popular. 
The currency boards introduced in Hong Kong (1983), Argentina (1991), Estonia
(1992), Lithuania (1994), Bulgaria (1997), and Bosnia (1997) are not the orthodox
currency boards, but rather the currency-board-like systems, where monetary
authorities have some scope for discretionary policy. The currency board regimes were
implemented in these countries as a response to macroeconomic crises: falling output,
high inflation etc., and the primary reason for having a currency board arrangement was
stabilization and credibility (see Table 1). Another set of countries that are now
operating currency boards  Brunei Darrussalam (from 1967), Djibouti (1949), and
member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (from 1965)  did not
established currency board regimes because of macroeconomic crises, but rather
opted for fixing their exchange rates because they were small, open economies with
little experience in the monetary policy management [Santiprabhob, 1997]. In the
following discussion on the experience of currency board countries, the attention will
be put on the former group of countries, those who established currency board
arrangements in response to unfavorable macroeconomic conditions. The discussion
on Bosnia will be also skipped.
3.1. Design of Existing Currency Boards
Usually, the existing currency boards combine a fixed exchange rate, either to a dollar
or to the German mark, the right to exchange domestic currency at this rate on demand,
and a long-term commitment to the system, often set out directly in the central bank law.
The central bank is required to hold sufficient foreign reserves to cover its monetary
liabilities. Under a strict currency board regime, the role of the central bank is limited to
issuing notes and coins, and the central bank cannot act as a lender of last resort in the
case of a liquidity crisis. However, under a modified arrangement, there is a possibility to
introduce some monetary policy instruments in order to be able to provide liquidity to
temporarily illiquid but solvent banks.
8
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authority, usually in practice only banks are able to convert local currency there. From all
considered countries, only Bulgaria guarantees access to foreign exchange at the central
bank to general public [Santiprabhob, 1997].
As to the backing rule, usually monetary authorities are required by law to keep
100 percent of monetary base in foreign assets and gold. Argentina is the exception,
with compulsory coverage of backing of 66.6 percent of monetary base. This is
because one third of the reserves against the monetary base can be held, since 1995,
in Argentine government bonds [Hanke, Schuler, 1999:2]. Usually monetary
authorities keep coverage in excess of 100 percent, as in the case of Estonia  125%
in May 1998 [Pautola and Backé, 1998], Bulgaria  134% in 1999 [Anastassova, 1999],
and Lithuania  141% in April 1999 [IMF, 1999c]. These excess reserves are held to
protect the currency boards in case the securities they held lost value and can be used
in a discretionary fashion, like repurchases or foreign currency dealing.
Usually, the legislation prevents these currency boards from printing money to bail
out the government-owned banks, financial institutions, or state-owned enterprises, as in
the case of Argentina (1991 Convertibility Law), Estonia (1992 Foreign Currency Law,
Currency Law, Law on the Security of Estonian Kroon, and 1993 Law of the Central Bank
of Republic of Estonia), Lithuania, and Bulgaria (Bulgaria National Bank law). The
exception is a narrowly defined credit to temporarily troubled financial institutions.
Although this last activity is subject to many constraints.
Successful functioning of a currency board often required the reorganization of the
administrative agency. Both Bulgaria National Bank and Bank of Estonia reorganized
their central banks into the Issue Department and the separate Banking Department.
The Issue Department is responsible for the issuing and redeeming monetary liabilities
to the peg currency at the official exchange rate on demand, that is it has the function
to run the currency board. The Banking Department manages "excess coverage", and
can also hold all other assets and claims on the central bank [Gulde, 1999]. Monetary
authorities of Lithuania, Argentina, and Hong Kong maintain all accounts on a unified
balance sheet.
There has also been a need to introduce some additional measures enhancing
macroeconomic stabilization along the legal changes. Bulgaria, in order to end previous
large-scale financing of the budget, created the Fiscal Reserve Account aimed to restrict
any short-term financing requirement of the budget. Thus, the budgetary accounts were
consolidated, and their balances  held in the Issue Department  are now showing funds
available to the government [Gulde, 1999]. Maintaining a minimum balance provides public
assurance that the government will honor its commitments, and that there won't be too
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coverage.
Generally, the power to change the backing rule and the exchange rate rule does not
lie in the competencies of the central bank. The Bank of Estonia has the right to revalue
the exchange rate, but devaluation can only be done by the act of Parliament. The
exchange rate can be changed by the Bank of Lithuania, but only under extraordinary
circumstances and in consultation with the government. The exchange rate can be
changed in Bulgaria only by the act of Parliament, and only by the act of Congress in
Argentina. However, Argentine central bank is not required to buy foreign exchange at
the fixed exchange rate and, thus, can let the peso appreciate [Santiprabhob, 1997].
All the selected currency board arrangements were implemented as a response to
a macroeconomic crisis. Hong Kong, which introduced the currency board
arrangement in 1983, was experiencing a downward pressure on the Hong Kong
dollar, and was running trade deficits during the earlier period of free-float. There was
a stock market crash, there were runs on small banks, and real estate prices collapsed
[Kwan and Lui, 1996]. Argentina had chronic inflation and periodic hyperinflation
during the 1980s, which led to the widespread dollarization of the economy.
Moreover, chronic public sector deficits were crowding out private sector credit
[Garcia-Herrero, 1997]. More recently, countries of Eastern Europe found themselves
in a very bad macroeconomic situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Estonia
experienced in 1992 a sharp fall in output, high inflation, and a trade shock leading to
the loss of exports markets, and to the shortage of goods. Monetary arrangements
and payments systems were badly functioning [Pautola and Backé, 1998]. Lithuania left
the ruble zone also in 1992, but before decided to adopt a currency board regime in
1994, suffered from high inflation, falling production, budget deficit, and trade and
current account deficits. Increasing number of transactions taking place in Lithuania at
this time was conducted in foreign currency [Pautola, Backé, 1998]. Bulgaria had a
period of near hyperinflation at the beginning of 1997. Monetary authorities were
providing money to the weak banking system, and were continuously financing
growing budget deficit. The confidence in the domestic currency was falling.
International reserves held at the central bank were low. Real GDP fell by over 10%
in 1996. Low credibility in the pre-currency board Bulgarian banking system
manifested itself also in bank runs [Gulde, 1999].
The primary reason for putting into force currency board regimes in these countries
was to immediately gain credibility and stabilize the economy. As the following section
shows, the quick implementation of the currency board rules together with some
additional measures generally allowed achieving these goals.
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The effects of having currency board in operation are significantly positive for Estonia
and Bulgaria. Currency board contributed to Estonian growth by enhancing both foreign
and domestic investment and confidence in maintaining strict monetary policy. Expanding
capital inflows reduced interest rates, although not to the level of German ones. The
operation of currency board in Estonia has been also associated with fiscal discipline. And
although Estonian kroon felt pressures on several occasions, and some of them led to
banks collapse, the government remained committed to this monetary regime since its
implementation in 1992 [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
Under the currency board, Bulgaria managed to reduce inflation and rebuilt foreign
reserves. Interest rates went down, and retail interest rates practically converged to the
levels of German ones [Gulde, 1999]. The demand for lev-denominated cash has risen
[Pautola and Backé, 1998]. So far, there were some slippages in the field of structural
reforms, but the general record is satisfactory. There was no need for the Banking
Department to act as a lender of last resort. What is interesting, despite close economic
ties, Bulgaria was not affected by the Russian crisis of 1998 [Gulde, 1999]. It is a success
story so far.
In order to achieve so much desired economic stabilization, governments of Estonia
and Bulgaria had to implement a number of reforms and standards. They also had to
maintain fiscal discipline. In spite of creating legal and institutional framework for the
currency board arrangement, and accumulating enough foreign reserves, Estonian
authorities fully liberalized current account, and later  also capital account transactions.
The government has showed its deep commitment to maintain the currency board.
Banking sector was reorganized and privatized. Estonian authorities have also taken a
number of measures to strengthen the financial system  like setting the capital adequacy
requirements to limit commercial bank credit, introducing appropriate risk management
standards, and official supervision [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
Bulgaria had to eliminate previous large-scale financing of the budget and barriers to
bank privatization. The monetary authorities had to restructure countrys foreign
exchange reserves to match the link with the German mark  Bulgarian central bank
opted for safe DM-denominated assets. Monetary authorities strengthened banking
supervision and introduced clear rules on accounting and reporting requirements [Pautola
and Backé, 1998]. Bulgaria also reformed tax system in 1997, speeded up the
privatization, and improved business environment for foreign direct investors.
Contrary to the examples of Bulgaria and Estonia, the experience of the currency
board arrangement in Lithuania is more mixed. Although its operation has not been
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rates. Output started to recover in 1995. However, fiscal deficit has been all the time at
the level of about 2% of GDP , and both current account and trade deficits significantly
increased. Moreover, Lithuanian interest rates have not yet converged with the rates in
developed industrial countries. The advantages of operating the currency board in
Lithuania are directly associated with the creation of legal institutional framework and with
launching the privatization in the banking sector. The slow pace of this privatization,
however, accounts for major banking problems experienced during 19941996.
When, at the end of 1994 and in 1995, some Lithuanian banks experienced liquidity
problems, the Bank of Lithuania loosened reserve requirements for commercial banks.
As a result, problems in the banking sector deepened. Two commercial banks were
closed and the two state-owned banks were recapitalized. Generally, the Lithuanian
currency board suffered from shaken credibility and the devaluation rumors. In 1995, the
Bank of Lithuania lost more than a tenth of its reserves in two months. The situation has
prevented Lithuanian interest rates from converging to the developed countries levels.
After the banking crisis, however, the monetary authorities introduced capital adequacy
rules, minimum capital requirements, standards for foreign exchange exposure, and
liquidity limits [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
The outcomes of two other still operating currency board regimes  of Argentina and
Hong Kong  occupy the middle ground between the experience of the two countries
that succeeded in providing credibility and stabilizing the economy and the somehow
mixed experience of Lithuania. Although both Argentina and Hong Kong faced some
disruptions during the recent years, the operation of currency boards there brought
important advantages, and their governments remain committed to this type of monetary
arrangement. 
The story of Argentina resembles a little Lithuanian experience. Argentina was
strongly affected by the Tequila crisis in 1995, and bank runs that happened resulted in
the elimination of some weakest financial institutions [IMF , 1998]. During this year
Argentine GDP fell down by over 4% [Garcia-Herrero, 1997]. Nevertheless, the long run
effects associated with the currency board arrangement in Argentina manifested itself in
lower inflation, reduced fiscal deficit, and accelerated economic growth (8% in 1997)
[IMF , 1998]. Generally, the Convertibility Plan adopted in 1991 fundamentally changed the
nature of the economy, and the currency board has worked for Argentina. However, the
country still has large and growing current account deficit and a very high rate of
unemployment.
Generally, the basis for the successful stabilization in Argentina were created by the
adoption of 1991 Convertibility Law, which established the currency board monetary
12
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arrangement, and by the financial systems reforms. Argentina also eliminated, by 1993,
restrictions on capital flows, and relaxed or abolished barriers to export and import. The
government eliminated all price controls, and deregulated trade and some professional
services between 1989 and 1992. Until 1994 about 90% of all state-owned enterprises
was privatized, and this brought considerable gains in economic efficiency. Finally, after
the 1995 crisis, financial regulations were tightened and some structural measures to
accelerate the consolidation of the banking system and to foster financial intermediation
were introduced. This lowered costs of financial services [IMF , 1998].
Hong Kongs banks experienced some problems under the currency board regime in
the 1980s, and the government was supporting them by emergency funds at that time.
There were also some short-lived bank runs in 1991. Occasionally, Hong Kong dollar has
been subject to speculative pressure, like recently, as a result of 1997 Asian financial crisis
[IMF , 1999A]. Despite these disruptions, Hong Kong authorities remained committed to
the currency board regime since 1983. The currency board arrangement brought many
advantages; among others it managed to lower inflation, although it also reduced the
growth rate. Kwan and Lui (1996) point at stabilization property of the Hong Kong
currency board  they found that output and prices were less volatile under the currency
board than under free floating.
Under the currency board arrangement output can be very sensitive to demand
shocks. It is argued that the steady, rule-based fiscal policy facilitated to keep output
relatively stable in Hong Kong [IMF , 1999A]. Government has maintained self-discipline in
fiscal policy: budget has been balanced, and the size of the government itself has been
kept small. It should be mentioned that fiscal restraint also strengthened credibility in the
exchange rate system, especially when Hong Kong Monetary Authority has been acting
as a lender of last resort in the 1990s.
From all the considered examples of existing currency board arrangements only
Lithuania has begun a gradual exit from this exchange rate regime. Mainly for the reason
of gaining more experience in operating monetary policy, the three-stage exit procedure
started in 1997 [Pautola and Backé, 1998]. Firstly, the Bank of Lithuania launched some
new monetary instruments, with a view to harmonize them with the instruments of the
European Central Bank, while still fully backing the reserves. The central bank law was
supposed to be amended at this stage, however as a result of the Russian crisis, the exit
from the currency board has been postponed [IMF , 1999c]. The second stage, during
which the introduction of a more active control of money supply and interest rates was
planned, together with the broadening of assets eligible for backing, is not being actively
considered. New Monetary Policy Program, which ought to be drawn in late 1999,
should specify future exchange rate and monetary policies. Nevertheless, the Bank ofLithuania has begun to gradually diversify its international reserves to reflect an increased
share of EU currencies. It was intended that in the last stage, the litas would be pegged
to the euro. However, even the move to peg the litas to the 5050 euro and dollar basket
is unlikely to take place earlier than 2000 [IMF , 1999c:7].
One of the main objectives of this program was to slowly transform the currency
board arrangement in order to allow the central bank to act in the traditional way,
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Table 1. Basic descriptions of some existing currency board regimes
Country Bulgaria Estonia




Bulgaria National Bank divided
into Issue Department and
Banking Department
Bank of Estonia divided into
Issue Department and Banking
Department





General public In principle, the general public,
in practice only banks
Backing rule 100% of monetary base 100% of monetary base
Assets eligible for
backing




Credibility and stability (in the
period of near-hyperinflation,
falling GDP, growing budget
deficit, low international
reserves, and bank runs)
Credibility and stability (in the
period of high inflation, sharp
fall in GDP, malfunctioning
payments and monetary
arrangements, shortage of
goods and raw materials, and




none so far Two banking crises (1992 and
1994) when many banks
collapsed due to their weak
balance sheets and tight
monetary conditions implied
by the currency board regime




converged to the level of
German rates
Macroeconomic stabilization
with lower inflation, enhanced
growth, and increased both
public and foreign investors
confidence15
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Table 1. Basic descriptions of some existing currency board regimes (continued)
Country Lithuania Argentina








Central Bank of Argentine
Republic





Commercial banks In principle, the general public,
in practice only banks
Backing rule 100% of monetary base and
the central banks liquid
liabilities
Minimum 100% of monetary
base (although since 1995 1/3




Foreign assets and gold;
increasing share of EU
currencies





Credibility and stability (in the
period of falling output, high






Banking crisis during 1994
1996, when banks had liquidity
problems, and when, in 1994,
the Bank of Lithuania made
exemptions from reserve
requirements
Financial contagion and real
sector problems as a result of
the Russian crisis, which led to
the abandonment of exit from
currency board
Argentina suffered from the
1995 Tequila crisis (GDP went
down by 4%)
Major successes Macroeconomic stabilization
with falling inflation, lower
interest rates (although not
equal to the levels of
developed industrial
countries), and modest output
growth
Credibility, lower inflation,
limited fiscal deficit and
encouraged domestic growthsmoothing undesired fluctuations coming from supply or demand shocks [Anastassova,
1999]. This argument seems to be of high importance since it is claimed that Lithuania is
and will be very sensitive to external shocks. Moreover, the positive experience from
operating the currency board proves that some credibility has been already gained
[Pautola and Backé, 1998]. On the other side, the arguments in favor of exit from the
currency board have been partly of political nature: the regime was introduced by the
post-communists, and the current government coalition has demanded its abandonment
from the very beginning.
At the moment there is no need to abandon the currency board regime in Estonia,
although some economists argue that it should happen in the future [Pautola and Backé,
1998]. As to Bulgaria, the question of exit the currency board is not an option at the
present stage [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
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Table 1. Basic descriptions of some existing currency board regimes (continued)
Country Hong Kong




Exchange Fund under the
supervision of the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority






Backing rule Minimum 100% of Certificate
of Indebtedness issued to the











Banks in troubles in the 1980s;
occasionally Hong Kong dollar
has been subject to speculative
pressure
Major successes Low inflation, output and price
stability
Source: Santiprabhob (1977:35-36), Pautola and Backé (1998), Gulde (1999), Anastassova (1999), Hanke and
Schuler (1999), Camard (1996), Garcia-Herrero (1997), IMF (1998), IMF (1999a), Kwan and Lui (1996), IMF (1999c)4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Currency Board 
Arrangement
One of the main advantages of the implementation of the currency board is that it
allows to quickly build up credibility. This feature is particularly important in times
of economic crises, as was pointed out in the previous section. The institutional
regulations, that need to be imposed to have a currency board in place, prohibit
government borrowings from central bank, and require that monetary authorities
hold enough reserves to at least cover its entire monetary liabilities. Financial markets
can thus be assured that every domestic currency bill is backed by an equivalent
amount of foreign currency, and no matter what, the liquid money can be always
converted into some hard" currency. The demand for domestic currency is therefore
higher [Gulde, 1999].
The currency board arrangement provides an automatic balance of payments
adjustment mechanism. Because monetary authorities cannot sterilize capital flows,
a balance of payments deficit coming from a fall in the foreign exchange reserves tightens
domestic liquidity, which leads to higher interest rates, then to reduced absorption, and
finally reverses the deficit [Pautola and Backé, 1998; Santiprabhob, 1997].
Another argument in favor of currency board is that it often promotes
transparency in the banking system. Monetary authorities are obliged to publish
frequently their accounts in order to ensure that the backing rule is always observed, and
that the credibility is always maintained. The transparency is very important when
monetary authorities under the currency board arrangement want to provide lender of
last resort assistance [Santiprabhob, 1997]. The currency board may also limit moral
hazard in the banking system restricting support to the banks that are poorly managed or
badly supervised [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
Moreover, the currency boards tend to promote sound fiscal policy, as in the case
of Estonia, Bulgaria, Argentina, and Hong Kong. The restrictions connected with the
currency board regime limit the room for maneuver of fiscal policy, and thus force the
government to follow more tough fiscal policy. But it should be noted that this is the
simultaneous implementation of the fiscal discipline and the currency board regime that
leads to the macroeconomic success [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
Empirical studies prove that currency boards tend to deliver low inflation and
better growth results than other economies. Ghosh et al. (1998) examined data on 10
currency board countries that operated a currency board during the 19701996 period
(Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Dominica, Djibouti, Estonia, Grenada, Hong Kong,
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currency board arrangements was about 4 percentage points lower than under other
pegged exchange rate regimes, and that the majority of this differential can be explained
by higher money demand for a given money growth rate in these countries. Countries
with currency boards were also found to grow faster on average than countries with
pegged exchange rate regimes. Although these higher growth rates cannot be ascribed to
the choice of the exchange rate regime alone, the alternative hypothesis, that currency
board countries grow actually slower, did not find support in the data. Anastassova (1999)
analyzed data on 6 countries, that recently adopted the currency board, for the
19841998 period (Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong, and Lithuania) and
came to the similar conclusions. Countries in her sample exhibited almost 3 percentage
points lower inflation differential when put against other pegged exchange rate systems,
and 1 percentage point advantage over the countries with the exchange rate systems
similar to currency boards. The results for growth were identical to those obtained by
Ghosh et al. (1998). The rationale for having better inflation performance for any given
level of output comes from the fact that firms and households have lower inflation
expectations, due to the credible peg of the exchange rate, so they tend to set wages and
prices accordingly [Frankel, 1999].
The currency board may be particularly attractive for countries where foreign
currencies are used in a parallel manner to legal domestic currency, which is the
case of many transition economies. In such cases, the country can gain more by linking
tightly the domestic currency to this "target" currency via a currency board and thus
stabilize the economy [Pautola and Backé, 1998].
Moreover, since money supply is determined solely by market forces, and there is no
room for monetary policy under the currency board, this type of exchange rate
arrangement may be a very good option for countries with limited expertise in
monetary management and a week political commitment in favor of anti-
inflationary policy.
The most frequently listed disadvantage of the currency board is that the central
bank cannot act as a lender of last resort providing liquidity to the banks in financial
trouble. At most, the lender of last resort role is limited to the emergency fund that is
financed from the central bank profits [Gulde, 1999]. Since this support can often mitigate
the effects of a liquidity crisis and containing spreading risks, its absence may cause
spreading out individual banks problems to the whole banking system more easily.
Exactly this situation took place in Argentina in 1995 [Santiprabhob, 1997].
Another important disadvantage of the currency board regime is that this purely
rule-based arrangement tends to be inflexible, which can be particularly painful
18
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to adjust. And since wages are often sticky, the adjustment process is both more costly
in terms of output and unemployment [Pautola and Backé, 1998], and the country
must live with the recession  in case of an adverse disturbance  for some time
[Frankel, 1999]. On the other hand, flexibility is a price for credibility. And since it is
impossible to have both credibility and flexibility, and a country lacks credibility for any
reason, its choice is limited.
The currency board arrangements are often likely to face higher short-run interest
rate volatility, since the interest rates play a major role in the market clearing under the
currency board regime, when monetary operations are constrained by the backing rule.
This is to say that banks have to accept the burden of adjustments [Santiprabhob, 1997].
It is also argued that the currency board arrangement can slow down learning
process in transition economies, where this type of monetary regime was
implemented in times of economic crisis, and since then a country has had no experience
in designing and conducting monetary policy. Besides, the choice of monetary policy
instruments is limited. On the other hand, however, countries with currency boards learn
that prospects of economic growth do not depend on manipulation of monetary
aggregates.
There is also a problem of a real misalignment. The local currency can become
overvalued when the countrys inflation remains higher than that of the country to which
the currency is pegged. But, as Pautola and Backé (1998:76) write, this happens only
when real appreciation exceeds "the trend appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange
rate that is associated with above-average efficiency gains".
Other disadvantage of the currency board may manifest itself in the problem of
collecting sufficient levels of foreign reserves to fully back monetary base, when the
economy that wants to adopt the currency board is not very small [Pautola and Backé,
1998].
Finally, it should be stressed once more that the introduction of the currency
board does not guarantee sound fiscal policy. If the government has an access to
international financial markets, it can still go into debt there.
Generally, the currency board can build up credibility of the monetary authorities,
enhance economic growth, result in lower inflation, and foster sound fiscal policy.
However, under the currency board arrangement, the monetary authority cannot act as
a lender of last resort, and the process of adjustment to adverse external shocks can be
long and painful due to wage rigidities. However, one can argue that the extent of wage
rigidities is smaller when wage setters cannot anticipate monetary or exchange rate
accommodation of their decisions.
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to Implement a Currency Board Regime?
After having discussed the design of the currency board arrangements, the examples
of existing currency boards, and the pros and cons for operating this type of exchange
rate regime, this final section lists the preconditions that should be fulfilled if a country
wants to implement this monetary framework.
Following Frankel (1999), it should be noted that the traditional argument of being a
small, open economy, where the exchange rate uncertainty is a serious issue, brings the
considerations of fixed exchange rate regime. However, a country that wishes to succeed
in the currency board based stabilization program, needs to satisfy some additional
criteria.
Firstly, it should have a strong need to import monetary stability and a desire for
further close integration with the particular trading partner, which gives the advantage of
strengthening political credibility of the commitment. To build up credibility, the country
must also have an access to an adequate level of reserves. Furthermore, the
implementation of the currency board can be beneficial if adopted in an economy, where
the foreign currency is already widely used [Frankel, 1999].
Experience of existing currency boards shows, that the implementation of this type
of arrangement requires the construction of the coherent legal framework, and hence,
the broad-based parliamentary support. The operation of a currency board must have a
strong support in law. Besides, the currency board is only one element of the stabilization
program. Its relative success depends on the implementation of appropriately designed
supporting measures [Gulde, 1999], form which fiscal discipline, deregulation, and
privatization are the most important. As has already been described, countries that
maintained fiscal discipline (Estonia, Bulgaria) did very well, while Lithuania  where the
implementation of the currency board was not associated with fiscal discipline 
experienced problems under a currency board system.
One of the important preconditions for implementing the currency board is that the
country in question must have a healthy and well-supervised financial system. Because
monetary authority under the currency board cannot pursue monetary policy, the
country that wish to adopt the currency board must in particular satisfy some conditions
consistent with maintaining bank soundness. First of all, in most cases government should
implement a contingent bank restructuring program into its stabilization plan, and should
clearly allocate recourses for this purpose in the budget or obtain them from some
external sources. This will help to reduce short run interest rate volatility. The emergency
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make sure that loans are collateralized by safe assets, and that they are granted only on
the short term basis to solvent but temporary illiquid banks, and that there is a penalty
rate. This would limit moral hazard in the banking system. The establishment of high
reserve requirements, that can be relaxed during the banking crisis, thus allowing to
compensate central bank inability to act as a lender of last resort, should be also taken
into account. In order to ensure stability in the banking system, there is often a need to
impose banking regulation and supervision that are stronger than the international
standards. To prevent deposit runs resulting from losses of an individual bank, deposit
insurance scheme should be introduced. Moreover, since under the currency board
arrangement monetary authority cannot actively provide support to the banking system,
insolvent banks should be closed before the implementation of the currency board. To
improve the liquidity management, the monetary authority should develop the necessary
infrastructure for inter-bank dealing. Finally, financial systems of a currency board country
should be opened to foreign financial institutions that are adequately supervised in their
home countries, since these institutions can relay on their headquarters in obtaining
liquidity when needed and they tend to promote competitiveness and efficiency in the
whole banking system [Santiprabhob, 1997].
Generally, if the currency board is to be successful, there must exist an adequate level
of reserves, fiscal discipline, healthy and well supervised financial system, and a rule of law
[Frankel, 1999].
The attractiveness of the relative success of currently existing currency board
countries convinced some advocates of currency boards to call further for the orthodox
currency board systems in countries suffering from macroeconomic crisis, like Russia,
that do not have typical characteristics of a currency board candidate. The main argument
in favor of a successful implementation of a currency board there is that only an orthodox
currency board system is able to deliver credibility and promote transparency.
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